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In “Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron”, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler 
employ recent research in behavioral economics to suggest a way in which a government planner 
could both enact paternalistic policies and respect freedom of choice.
2
  I will assess their 
suggestion in light of two of the most common anti-paternalist arguments.  John Stuart Mill and 
Joel Feinberg exemplify these anti-paternalist positions.  Section 1 of this paper introduces the 
anti-paternalist arguments made by Mill and Feinberg.  Section 2 outlines Sunstein and Thaler’s 
suggestion and the empirical research it is based on.  Sections 3 and 4 assess their suggestion in 
light of arguments introduced in section 1.  In section 3, some of the points raised by Mark White 
in his book The Manipulation of Choice: Ethics and Libertarian Paternalism, which was written 
in response to Sunstein and Thaler, are considered. 
3
  I side with Sunstein and Thaler against 
White.   
I will work with the following definition of paternalism.  A policy (or law, or institution, 
or whatever) counts as paternalistic if and only if the justification offered for that policy is of the 
following two-part form: 1) the policy will influence a person’s actions 2) in a way that promotes 
the welfare of that person.  Note three things about this definition.   
First, the definition speaks of the justification being “offered”.  Offered by whom?  A 
paternalistic justification might be offered by government planners as their actual reason for 
enacting a policy, or it might be offered by philosophers as a reason for thinking that a certain 
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policy is morally permissible.  Either way, the policy would count as paternalistic relative to the 
person offering the justification.   
Second, whether or not a policy counts as paternalistic depends on the justification that is 
offered for that policy, not on the content of the policy.  So a law that prohibits public smoking 
on the grounds that secondhand smoke harms others is not paternalistic, but if the same 
prohibition is enacted on the grounds that it promotes the welfare of smokers, it is paternalistic.   
Third, it is clear that, on this definition of paternalism, some paternalistic policies are 
permissible.  Or, if they are not permissible, it is not because they are paternalistic that they are 
forbidden.  Policies directed towards children are the clearest case.  There are arguments for 
thinking that 1) choices made by adults are especially morally important and 2) this importance 
gives us reason for thinking that many paternalistic policies are impermissible.  But these 
arguments do not produce reasons for thinking that choices (perhaps “choices” is better) made by 
children have the same importance.  Therefore, paternalistic policies directed towards children 
are not objectionable.  Or, if they are objectionable, it is not because they are paternalistic.  
Because children are a special case, this paper’s discussion will be restricted to adults from now 
on.   
Even when the discussion is restricted to adults, it is plausible that some paternalistic 
policies are permissible.  This is because not all paternalistic policies directed towards adults fall 
afoul of the importance of choices.  For example, consider a government anti-smoking 
information campaign of the most innocuous kind.  The government produces informational 
pamphlets and leaves them in government buildings for members of the public to pick up, if they 
want.  Such a campaign does not seem to run afoul of the importance of choices because one can 
simply walk past the pamphlets.  Similarly, Sunstein and Thaler think they have identified a class 
of paternalistic policies that respect choice.  In order to see why they think this, consider each of 
the two standard arguments for thinking that paternalistic policies often fail to respect choice.   
 
1.1 Mill 
The first argument is given by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty.
4
  Mill claims that a 
person’s decisions about how to run his or her own life will very often be better, as measured by 
his or her own welfare, than the decisions that a government planner would make.  This is 
because, to give just two reasons, individuals have better access to their own preferences than 
planners do, and individuals are motivated by self-interest to make decisions that satisfy their 
own preferences.  Government planners have no such motivation, or if they do, they will almost 
always have other motivations that conflict with it.  These considerations suggest that the general 
welfare is maximized if government planners leave people free to choose how to live their own 
lives.  This needs a qualification, of course.  The general welfare is maximized if you are left free 
to make your own choices, so long as you do not choose to, say, murder or steal.  These 
considerations form Mill’s basic argument for the harm principle, which he states as follows.  
“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”
5
   
At this point, I want to note two conventions that I will adopt throughout this paper.  
First, I will use the words ‘exercise of power’ slightly differently than Mill does.  The way Mill 
phrases the harm principle, it looks like cases of exercise of power over an individual can be 
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divided into two kinds: exercises of power that are against the individual’s will, and exercises of 
power that are not.  In this paper, I will reserve the phrase ‘exercise of power’ for the first kind of 
case.  If an exercise of power over an individual has that individual’s consent, it will not, strictly 
speaking, be counted as exercise of power at all.  This, I think, will make for a clearer exposition, 
and it is in line with the spirit of Mill’s words anyways.     
Second, Mill’s harm principle covers all of the ways in which society might exercise 
power over individuals, but Sunstein and Thaler are interested just in the exercise of power by 
the government.  This paper’s discussion will be restricted to that topic.   
Returning to the exposition of Mill’s argument against paternalism, the justification 
offered for paternalistic policies is by definition not a harm to others justification.  Therefore, if a 
paternalistic policy involves the exercise of power over individuals, then it is ruled out by the 
harm principle.  If it does not, however, it is not ruled out.  Many paternalistic policies clearly do 
involve the exercise of power over individuals, and so they are ruled out.  For example, if the 
sole justification for the criminalization of marijuana is the negative effects it has on those who 
use it voluntarily, then the harm principle requires its decriminalization.  This is because 
criminalization involves physical coercion, and if anything counts as the exercise of power over 
individuals, physical coercion does.   
Does the anti-smoking information campaign described above involve the exercise of 
power over individuals?  It is intended to influence the behavior of individuals.  However, if that 
is all that is required for it to count as exercising power over individuals, then many of the 
everyday activities of individuals and businesses involve the exercise of power over individuals.  
Surely, then, the line between what counts as the exercise of power over individuals and what 
does not should be drawn so that not every way of influencing individuals counts as exercising 
power over them.  The question Where to draw the line between what counts as the exercise of 
power over individuals and what does not? will recur throughout this paper.  So too will a 
second question about the interpretation of the harm principle, namely, What counts as a harm?  
It does not seem like every way of making someone else worse off counts.  For example, if I do 
not like unnatural hair colors, then I am made worse off by my neighbor’s dyed blue hair, but we 
should not say that this harms me.  If we did, society would be authorized to exercise power over 
my blue-haired neighbor in order to get her to change her hair color.   
 
1.2 Feinberg  
Mill’s anti-paternalist argument is consequentialist.  He argues that choice is especially 
morally important because respecting choice promotes the general welfare.  The second standard 
anti-paternalist argument is a rights-based argument.  Joel Feinberg’s four volume The Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law exemplifies this approach
6
.  Feinberg assumes as an axiom that 
individuals have a right to autonomy.  Feinberg makes two claims about what this right involves.  
First, if the government’s policies are not constrained by the harm principle, then they violate 
this right.
7
  The second claim is connected to Feinberg’s answer to the question What counts as a 
harm?  A harm is a rights violation, Feinberg says.  What counts as a rights violation?  Feinberg 
does not offer a complete answer to this question.  A complete theory of rights is outside the 
scope of his books.  The goal of his books is to argue against paternalism and legal moralism.  In 
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order to do this, he does not need a complete theory of rights.  All he needs is the claim that all 
plausible theories of rights include the volenti maxim.  Roughly, the volenti maxim states that ‘to 
one who consents, no harm is done’.  So, for example, you violate my rights if you take my 
possessions without my consent.  But with my consent, you may have them.  In general, the 
volenti maxim is the claim that you have a right to waive your rights, whatever your rights are.  
A failure to follow the volenti maxim is a failure to respect the right to autonomy, Feinberg 
thinks.  This is the second of the two claims that Feinberg makes about what the right to 
autonomy involves.   
Taken together, the volenti maxim and the harm principle rule out many paternalistic 
policies.  For example, take laws against voluntary euthanasia.  If I voluntarily consent to a lethal 
injection, to be administered by a doctor, then by the volenti maxim, she does not violate my 
rights by killing me with that injection.  The harm principle allows the exercise of power over 
individuals only to prevent the violation of the rights of others.  Therefore, the law may not 
exercise power over the doctor in order to keep me alive, even if the government planner judges 
that it is in my best interest to stay alive.   
On Feinberg’s view, are any paternalistic policies permissible?  Feinberg limits his 
discussion to criminal law.  Every case of paternalism that Feinberg considers is paternalism 
through the criminal law.  Criminalization always involves physical coercion because it is always 
backed up by threats of imprisonment or execution.  As I said above, if anything counts as 
exercise of power over individuals, physical coercion does.  Therefore, every case of paternalism 
Feinberg considers involves the exercise of power by the government over individuals.    
Therefore, every case of paternalism Feinberg considers is ruled out by the harm principle.   
Feinberg does not consider cases of paternalism, such as the anti-smoking information 
campaign discussed above, that arguably do not involve the exercise of power over individuals.  
The paternalistic policies that Sunstein and Thaler propose are supposed to be of this kind, so 
Feinberg’s position will have to be extended if it is to address their proposal.  I will extend it in 
section 3.   
Mill and Feinberg start from different premises, but they reach the same conclusion.  
Many paternalistic policies are impermissible because they do not respect freedom of choice.  
The argument that Sunstein and Thaler develop, based on research in behavioral economics, is of 
interest because this research was done after Mill and Feinberg wrote.  Or at least, it was in its 
infancy when Feinberg was writing.  I will now turn to Sunstein and Thaler’s argument.   
 
2 Sunstein and Thaler 
 Research in behavioral economics, some of it done by Sunstein and Thaler themselves, 
claims to have uncovered peculiarities in human behavior.  These peculiarities are sometimes, 
perhaps unfortunately, called “cognitive biases”.  One commonly cited cognitive bias involves 
what are called “default rules”.
8
  Consider the following example.  A firm offers a retirement 
savings plan to its employees.  It automatically enrolls each employee in the plan.  If an 
employee wishes not to enroll, he or she can opt-out by, say, filling out and submitting an online 
form.  Another firm offers an identical retirement plan, but its employees are not automatically 
enrolled.  If they wish to enroll, they must opt-in by filling out a similar online form.  Studies 
find that, everything else equal, more employees end up enrolled under the opt-out plan than 
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under the opt-in plan.  The way that the default rule is set, opt-in or opt-out, affects people’s 
behavior.   
What sort of psychological principle explains this phenomenon?  Why should behavior 
be affected by the way default rules are set?   The answer must be something like: People like to 
hang on to stuff that they have.  This psychological principle is given the name ‘endowment 
effect’.  To be more precise about what endowment effects involve, consider two situations.  In 
the first, a person has an item, and then loses it.  In the second, the person does not have the item, 
and then gains it.  Everything else equal, the person is likely to view the loss in the first situation 
as greater than the gain in the second situation.  This is just because people like to hang on to 
stuff that they have.   
 Sunstein and Thaler claim that, because of the endowment effect, default rules shape the 
preferences of individuals.  That is, the way a default rule is set literally changes what people’s 
preferences are.  If your employer initially enrolls you in a savings plan, you will value 
enrollment in that plan more than you would if you were not initially enrolled.  The default to 
enrollment changes the strength of your preference.    
There are other examples of cognitive biases.  Two notable ones go by the names ‘anchor 
effect’ and ‘framing effect’.  I will not discuss these here because the clearest and most 
compelling examples of situations in which paternalistic government policies might make use of 
cognitive biases involve default rules.   One very clear case, which I will focus on throughout 
this paper, comes from the field labor law.
9
  The government might allocate to firms the right to 
dismiss their employees at will, or it might allocate to employees the right to be dismissed only 
                                                 
9
 Sunstein and Thaler 1187.   
for cause.  In either case, the party allocated the right has the right to waive their right, if they 
wish.  This is required in order to comply with the volenti maxim.  In particular, the parties might 
be interested in waiving their rights if they can get something in return for doing so.  As part of a 
labor contract, employees might waive their right to be dismissed only for cause in return for 
higher wages.  Or firms might waive their right to dismiss at will in return for lower wages.  On 
the basis of the results of the savings plan study, as well as similar studies, Sunstein and Thaler 
hypothesize that employees will be more likely to end up with the right to be dismissed only for 
cause if they are initially assigned that right by the government.  I will assume that this 
hypothesis is correct.    
 On the basis of this hypothesis, Sunstein and Thaler develop the following line of 
reasoning.  Suppose that the government planner is concerned to protect the welfare of workers.  
Suppose also that the welfare of workers is promoted when they have the right to be dismissed 
only for cause.  Then the planner has good reason to assign the right to be dismissed only for 
cause to workers instead of assigning the right to dismiss at will to firms.   
This policy would count as paternalistic.  It takes advantage of the endowment effect in 
order to influence the behavior of workers for those workers’ own good.  Though it is 
paternalistic, Sunstein and Thaler argue that it does not infringe on freedom of choice.  Their 
basic argument is as follows.  The government planner has to either assign the right to 
employees, or assign the right to firms, or assign the right to neither.  If the planner takes the 
third option, there would be no default rule.  In this case, the government would have to require 
every employment contract to state explicitly whether the employee may be dismissed at will or 
only for cause.  Without either a default rule or an explicit statement in the contract, it would not 
be clear when it is legal to fire employees and when it is not.  Now, we know from empirical 
research that if the planner assigns the right to employees, there will be an endowment effect.   If 
the right is assigned to firms, will there be such an effect?  Do firms like to keep what they have?  
It is unclear.  It is clear, though, that if the planner assigns the right neither to employees nor to 
firms, there will be no endowment effect.  Sunstein and Thaler argue that, no matter which of the 
three options the government planner selects, the planner cannot avoid having an effect on what 
people’s preferences are.  If the planner assigns the right to employees, the preferences of 
employees will be different than if it did not.  No matter which government policy is selected, 
people’s preferences will be different than they would have been if an alternative policy had 
been selected.  Because the government planner cannot avoid having an effect on what people’s 
preferences are, then it might as well steer people’s preferences in a direction that is good for 
those people.    
Note one thing about this argument.  It relies on the claim that there is more to human 
well-being than just the satisfaction of preferences, whatever those preferences might be.  If there 
were not, then given the opportunity to steer preferences, the government would do best to steer 
them towards easily satisfied preferences.  But this is not what Sunstein and Thaler suggest. 
I will consider Sunstein and Thaler’s argument in light of Feinberg’s rights-based anti-
paternalist framework, and then in light of Mill’s consequentialist framework.   
  
3 Feinberg’s Framework 
Do the anti-paternalist considerations Feinberg offers rule out the sort of paternalism 
Sunstein and Thaler propose?  Or does Sunstein and Thaler’s proposal slip through?  Remember 
that Feinberg thinks that power may be exercised by the government over individuals only in 
order to prevent the violation of the rights of others.  The paternalistic policies Sunstein and 
Thaler propose do not, of course, have as their aim the protection of the rights of others.  
Therefore, Feinberg will allow the proposed policies only if it turns out that they do not involve 
the exercise of power over individuals.  So, what counts as the exercise of power over 
individuals?  I will consider two answers to this question.  The first is Nozick’s.  Nozick’s view 
is instructive because it is so minimal.  The second view, White’s, can be seen as modifying 
Nozick’s view by adding to it.   
 
3.1 Nozick’s Answer 
 For Nozick, what counts as the exercise of power over an individual?  The answer to this 
question can be extracted from section 2.8.7 “Voluntary Exchange” of Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia, in which Nozick cashes out coercion in terms of rights violations.
10
  The answer is as 
follows.  Divide the question into two parts.  What counts as illegitimate exercise of power over 
a person, and what counts as legitimate exercise of power over a person?  Exercise of power over 
a person is illegitimate if and only if that person’s rights are violated by that exercise of power.  
In light of this, we can say that exercise of power over a person is legitimate when it would have 
violated that person’s rights, if not for the presence of some mitigating factor.   
Like Mill and Feinberg, Nozick thinks that government policies ought to be limited by 
the harm principle.
11
  A government may exercise power over an individual only in order to 
protect the rights of others.  We can now restate the harm principle as follows.  A government 
legitimately exercises power over an individual only if it does so in order to protect other 
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individuals from illegitimate exercises of power over them.  The harm principle is the claim, 
then, that there is only one mitigating factor that can excuse the government from doing 
something that would otherwise count as a rights violation.  That factor is the protection of the 
rights of others. 
 To the harm principle, Nozick adds a further claim.  Individuals have a very limited set of 
rights.  This set includes a right against physical aggression, the right to keep property that was 
acquired without violating the rights of others, the right to performance on contracts, and the 
right to waive one’s rights (the volenti maxim).  If the set contains more rights than these, it does 
not contain many more.  In particular, it does not contain a right to be free from the sort of 
influence that the paternalistic policies Sunstein and Thaler propose would have on individuals.  
The policies they propose influence what people’s preferences are.  Among Nozick’s set of 
rights, there is no right against having what your preferences are influenced by government 
policy.  Therefore, this sort of influence does not count as the exercise of power over individuals.  
Therefore, the harm principle does not rule out the policies that Sunstein and Thaler propose.  
Therefore, Nozick’s view allows the paternalistic policies that Sunstein and Thaler suggest.  
Perhaps this is surprising, considering the limited scope Nozick allows the government and 
Nozick’s description of his theory as “nonpaternalistic”.
12
  Or perhaps it is not surprising, 
considering Sunstein and Thaler call their view “libertarian paternalism”.  Although, I do not 
think Sunstein and Thaler had in mind the line of reasoning just described when they gave their 
view that name.   
 A side note.  Nozick might respond to this line of reasoning as follows.  Though, 
Sunstein and Thaler have identified paternalistic policies that cannot be ruled out on the grounds 
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that they are paternalistic, they can still be ruled out for other reasons.  In particular, they require 
impermissible taxation.  This response will not work, however. According to Nozick, the 
government is permitted to tax in order to pay the costs associated with setting up and enforcing 
contract law.  It would cost no more money to set these laws up in the paternalistic way that 
Sunstein and Thaler suggest than it would to set them up otherwise, so this would not be 
forbidden on the grounds that it requires impermissible taxation. 
 
3.2 White’s Answer 
As I said above, Nozick’s view is instructive because it is so minimal.  If the results of 
Nozick’s theory are unsatisfactory, his theory could be added to in order to generate different 
results.  In particular, we could keep Nozick’s view about what counts as legitimate and 
illegitimate exercise of power over individuals, but add more rights.  Some of the moves that 
Mark White makes in The Manipulation of Choice are clarified if they are seen along these lines.  
White writes that “Paternalism…denies autonomy in two ways: by substituting someone else’s 
idea of a person’s interests for that person’s own, and by blocking or manipulating choice to 
promote the interest imposed by the paternalist”.
13
  Sunstein and Thaler (and Nozick) agree with 
White that choices should not be blocked off.  In fact, they write that “choices are not blocked or 
fenced off” by the policies they propose.
14
  Their disagreement is over the two additional 
requirements that White introduces.  White gives the perhaps unfortunate name ‘value 
substitution’ to the substitution of someone else’s idea of a person’s interests for that person’s 
own.  In addition to blocking choices, White suggests that value substitution and the 
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manipulation of choices are wrong because they violate autonomy.  I will address these two 
claims in turn.   
 Clearly not all value substitutions count as autonomy violations.  For example, I see that 
you are about to be hit by a car.  You do not see the car coming, and I have no time to alert you.  
If I want to save your life, the only thing I can do is push you out of the way.  If I push you, I do 
so because I have substituted my idea of your interests for your own, but pushing you is clearly 
not a violation of your right to autonomy.  This example shows that value substitution is only 
impermissible in certain situations.  Therefore, White’s claim needs to be qualified.  Perhaps 
value substitution is always impermissible when it is a government planner doing the 
substituting?  Reconsider the car accident example, but with a government agent, acting on a 
standing government policy, doing the pushing.  The moral assessment of the example does not 
change.  There is still no violation of autonomy.  Therefore, we need to search for a different 
way to qualify White’s claim.   
Perhaps value substitution fails to respect an individual’s autonomy when that individual 
could have been allowed to make a choice for him or herself, but was not.  However, this 
proposal too is subject to counterexamples.  For example, imagine a wealthy romantic who waits 
for his lover to fall asleep and then, without waking her, carries her gently onto a private plane 
and flies her off on a surprise vacation.  He could have consulted her, but that would have ruined 
the surprise.  Though he did not consult her, his actions appear permissible.  This 
counterexample suggests that the above conjecture does not apply to some interactions between 
individuals.   
Neither of the two qualifications I have considered has done the job on its own.  Perhaps 
a plausible version of White’s proposal can be reached by combining them.  The resulting 
proposal would read:  Value substitution on the part of the government planner fails to respect an 
individual’s autonomy when that individual could have been allowed to make a choice for him or 
herself, but was not.   
 This proposal is still subject to a problem.  What counts as not allowing an individual to 
make a choice for him or herself?  The obvious answer is: When power has been illegitimately 
exercised over that individual.  That is, when that individual’s rights have been violated by 
blocking or, White suggests, manipulating their choices.  Thus, it can be seen that White’s claim 
that value substitution violates autonomy collapses into his claim that blocking and manipulating 
choices violates autonomy.  White could avoid this collapse by qualifying his claim that value 
substitution violates autonomy in a different way than I have qualified it, but it seems to me that 
the qualifications I have suggested are the intuitively correct ones for dealing with the 
counterexamples I have highlighted.   
There is no controversy over the suggestion that blocking choices violates autonomy.  
Therefore I will turn to the suggestion that manipulating choice violates autonomy.  The aspect 
of the policies Sunstein and Thaler propose that might count as manipulative has already been 
clearly identified.  The policies they propose work by influencing what preferences individuals 
have.  They affect choice by changing what people’s preferences are.  At least sometimes, 
government policies that manipulate choice by changing what people’s preferences are do violate 
autonomy.  Consider, to give an extreme example, a government brainwashing campaign.  The 
task Sunstein and Thaler face, then, is to distinguish the sort of policy they propose from the 
brainwashing campaign and similar examples.   
I suggest that Sunstein and Thaler could make this distinction in the following way.  
Return to the labor law example.  The government planner has three options: assign the right to 
the employees, assign the right firms, or assign the right to neither and require every labor 
contract to deal with the issue explicitly.  The planner has harm to others grounds for taking at 
least one of these three options.  Assume, with Nozick and many other philosophers, that there is 
a right to performance on contracts.  If you make a contract with someone, you have a right 
against them for the performance of their duties under that contract.  It is this right that the 
government protects by writing and enforcing contract law.  In the particular labor law case 
under consideration, this right is protected by taking one of the three options.   
Does the government planner have harm to others grounds upon which it could select 
between these three options?  That is, would the planner violate anyone’s right by selecting one 
option rather than another?  If the answer is yes, the grounds for thinking so cannot be the sort of 
manipulation that White is worried about.  This is because each option is equally manipulative. 
No matter which option the planner selects, the preferences of individuals will be influenced.  
That is, the preferences of individuals will be different than they would have been had the 
planner selected a different option.  With manipulation of choice ruled out, I cannot think of any 
other grounds upon which to argue that the planner violates a right by selecting one option rather 
than another.  Therefore, I conclude that the government planner does not have harm to others 
grounds for selecting between the three options.   
On the basis of this conclusion, I propose the following principle.  If the government 
planner is justified on harm to others grounds in enacting either policy x or policy y (or policy z, 
and so on), and there are not harm to others ground upon which the planner can select between 
them, then the planner is justified in selecting between them on welfare grounds.  One welfare 
consideration that the planner might take into account is the one highlighted by Sunstein and 
Thaler.  That is, one of the policies might, through the mechanism of a cognitive bias, influence 
people’s preferences in a way that benefits those very people.  Other welfare considerations 
might be taken into account as well.  It would be laborious to require every labor contract to deal 
explicitly with the issue of when dismissal is permitted.  Just to save time, therefore, the planner 
might enact a default rule.  Or, on the other hand, we might find that the system for opting-out of 
the situation one is defaulted into is very complex and time consuming.  Just to save time, then, 
the government might forgo a default rule.  The considerations highlighted by Sunstein and 
Thaler have a legitimate place in this welfare calculation.   
I conclude that White does not offer compelling reasons for thinking that the policies that 
Sunstein and Thaler suggest violate rights.  Therefore, he does not offer compelling reasons for 
thinking that they are ruled out by the harm principle as illegitimately exercising power over 
individuals.  It is of course possible that some other philosopher might offer more compelling 
reasons for thinking that the policies that Sunstein and Thaler propose violate rights, but I cannot 
consider such a proposal until it is on the table.  This completes the discussion of Feinberg’s 
rights-based anti-paternalist framework.  I will now turn to Mill’s framework.   
 
4 Mill’s Framework 
 Do the anti-paternalist considerations that Mill offers rule out the sort of paternalism that 
Sunstein and Thaler propose?  Mill offers various considerations in favor of the claim that 
individuals are better at promoting the satisfaction of their own preferences than a government 
planner would be.  I will address these considerations in turn.   
 First, Mill claims that individuals know their own preferences better than a government 
planner could.  This claim is surely correct in general.  But in the cases highlighted by Sunstein 
and Thaler, what the preferences of individuals are depends on what policy the government 
pursues.  Sunstein and Thaler might say that, in the cases they focus on, the government planner 
has an easy way of knowing your interests.  That is because the plans the government planner 
makes will affect what your interests are.   
Second, Mill claims that, even if the government planner could know your interests, it 
would not have much incentive to care about them.  If this is true in general, it will inform how 
we write the constitution for the government.  When writing the constitution, we might reason as 
follows.  If we allow the government planner to pursue a certain sort of policy at its discretion, it 
will not make the decision about whether or not to pursue that policy with the general welfare in 
mind.  Instead, it will make the decision with the welfare of the planner (who ever that is, 
congress, say) in mind.  For example, if congress is allowed to permit or forbid the use of 
marijuana at its discretion, then campaign contributions from the beer industry might influence 
legislation on the issue more than concern for the general welfare.  This consideration might lead 
us to conclude that it is best for the general welfare to prohibit the government planner from 
pursuing certain sorts of policies altogether.  In particular, we might prohibit the planner from 
pursuing paternalistic policies.  Again, this certainly seems correct in general.  But the cases 
highlighted by Sunstein and Thaler are an exception.  Return again to the labor law case.  In 
order to create a background for contracts, the government has to select one of the three options.  
Could anything be gained by constitutionally requiring the planner not to take into account the 
sort of paternalistic consideration Sunstein and Thaler highlight when deciding which of the 
three options to select?  Suppose that one of the three options is in the best interest of the 
planner.  Prohibiting the planner from taking into account the paternalistic considerations that 
Sunstein and Thaler highlight would not make the planner less likely to select that option.    
 
5 Conclusion 
I have focused on the labor law case.  This is not, of course, the only case in which the 
government planner might make use of cognitive biases to enact paternalistic policies.  A 
policymaker would have to assess each case individually because welfare will be affected 
differently in each case.  Welfare considerations will be relevant because, as I have said, if policy 
x and policy y protect the rights of others equally, then the planner is justified in selecting 
between them on welfare grounds.   It is possible, then, that it is a good idea to enact some 
paternalistic policies that make use of cognitive biases but not others.  However, neither 
Feinberg’s rights-based anti-paternalist argument, as supplemented by White’s claims about 
rights, nor Mill’s consequentialist argument provide compelling reasons for ruling out the sort of 
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